The Millenium Development Goals and Sovereign Debt Write-downs by Sayantan Ghosal & Kannika Thampanishvong
CENTRE FOR DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
WORKING PAPER SERIES
*Acknowledgement: We thank Marcus Miller, Avinash Dixit, Lei Zhang, John Driffill,
Jonathan Thomas, Alan Sutherland, Trisha Rogers and the participants in the RES Annual
Conference 2006, the Economic Theory Workshop at Warwick, the EEA Conference 2007,
and the participants at the Summer Research Workshop and Conference “World Economy
and Global Finance” at Warwick for their useful comments. The second author would like to
thank the ORS Award Scheme, the CSGR and the Department of Economics at Warwick for
their financial supports.
†Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, CV4 7AL, Email Address:
S.Ghosal@warwick.ac.uk
‡Corresponding Author. School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, St
Andrews, UK, KY16 9AL, Tel: 44-(0)13-3446-2424, Fax: 44-(0)13-3446-2444, E-mail Address:
kt30@st-andrews.ac.uk
CASTLECLIFFE, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, KY16 9AL
TEL: +44 (0)1334 462445 FAX: +44 (0)1334 462444 EMAIL: cdma@st-andrews.ac.uk
www.st-andrews.ac.uk/cdma
CDMA07/18








University of St Andrews
OCTOBER 2007
ABSTRACT
Can sovereign debt write-downs be used to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs)? This paper shows that transparency of
domestic governance determines how a sovereign debt write-down is
structured to attain the MDGs. When domestic governance is transparent,
an unconditional debt write-down enhances non-elites’ welfare. Without
such transparency, conditions that directly link the debt write-down to
public goods that improve non-elites’ welfare are required. In the latter
case, in a dynamic setting, the debt write-down also has to be directly
linked to the amount of new debt issued. Using our formal analysis, we
evaluate the efficacy of the current debt relief initiatives and discuss some
policy implications.
Key words: Debt Write-down, Representativeness, Transparency,
Conditionality, Millennium Development Goals
JEL Classifications: C72, C78, D82, F341 Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (to be achieved by 2015)
were endorsed by 189 nations during the UN Millennium Summit in
September 2000 to serve as an international blueprint for responding to
the world’s development challenges. MDGs include “poverty alleviation,
promoting primary education and gender equality, improving maternal
health, combating child mortality, AIDS and other diseases, ensuring
environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for de-
velopment” (UNDP, 2007).
In related but distinct initiatives, such as the Heavily Indebted Poor
Country (hereafter, HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative (MDRI), multilateral organizations (like the World Bank, and
the G8 countries) have reduced indebtedness of low-income countries,
especially the HIPCs. However, the operation of such debt relief initia-
tives is not critically linked to a systematic assessment of each country’s
needs for debt relief, measured against explicit development objectives
like the MDGs (Sachs, 2002).
Can sovereign debt write-downs be used to achieve the MDGs? This
paper shows that transparency of domestic governance determines the
nature of the conditionality requirements attached to sovereign debt
write-downs to achieve the MDGs.
We study a model where domestic elites and non-elites have con‡ict-
ing preferences in allocating the available social surplus over di¤erent
types of public goods. We begin by showing how the allocation of avail-
able social surplus over di¤erent types of public goods is determined by
the distribution of bargaining power between the two classes. In our
setting, achieving the MDGs is synonymous with improving non-elites’
utility.
Transparency is the result of democratic and governance reforms that
have two properties. First, there is veri…able information about the rel-
ative weight attached to non-elites’ welfare in the allocation of social
surplus over di¤erent types of public goods. Second, non-elites are able
to hold domestic elites accountable so that the non-elites have some bar-
gaining power in making decisions about the allocation of social surplus
2over di¤erent public goods.
When domestic governance is transparent, an unconditional debt
write-down enhances non-elites’ welfare. Without such transparency,
conditions that directly link the debt write-down to public expenditure
that improves non-elites’ welfare are required. In a dynamic setting,
without transparency, in addition to linking the debt write-down to pub-
lic goods that improve non-elites’ welfare, the debt write-down also has
to be directly linked to the amount of new sovereign debt issued.
Using our formal analysis as a benchmark, we evaluate the e¢cacy of
the current debt relief initiatives, such as the enhanced HIPC initiative
and the MDRI, and discuss some policy implications.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we
study a model of sovereign debt write-down. Section 3 is devoted to eval-
uate the e¢cacy of the current mechanisms used to reduce indebtedness
of low-income countries, while section 4 concludes.
2 Conditionality in sovereign debt write-downs
Consider an economy consisting of two classes: a numerically small but
powerful elite (indexed by 1) and a numerically large but weak non-elite
(indexed by 2). Assume that there are two types of public goods: 1 and
2, where 1 denotes the public goods preferred by elites and 2 denotes
the public goods preferred by non-elites. Let  denote the portion of
social surplus spent on , where  = 12. We assume that  (12)
denotes the utility function for the elites and  (12) denotes the util-
ity function for the non-elites, where both  (12) and  (12) are
strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, concave functions.
Finally, let  denote the amount of available social surplus interpreted
as …scal resources not committed elsewhere.
Clearly, a sovereign debt write-down corresponds to the case when
there is an increase in the available …scal resources and is denoted by
¢. However, before studying how ¢ a¤ects non-elites’ welfare, we
begin by characterizing how  is being allocated over 1 and 21
1As matters stand, we do not allow for the possibility that some of the social
surplus may be directly consumed by either class in the form of transfers. Extending
3We make the following simplifying, assumptions on  (12) and
 (12):
Assumption 1:  (12) =  (21);
Assumption 2: 1 ( ¡ ) = 2 ( ¡ )  2 ( ¡ ) =
1 ( ¡ ), 0     and lim! 1 ( ¡ )  2 ( ¡ ).2
Assumption 1 implies that the utility of the two classes is symmetric
over 1, 2. Assumption 2 implies that starting from any allocation
with some expenditure on both public goods, the marginal utility to
class  from increasing expenditure on  is higher than the marginal
utility from an increase in expenditure on ,  6= ,  = 12. Taken
together, these two assumptions capture the con‡icting preferences of
the two classes in the allocation of social surplus over the two public
goods.
The social allocation problem
How is  being allocated over the two types of public goods? In
general, the relative weights attached elites’ and non-elites’ payo¤s in
the social welfare function (used to allocate  over 1 and 2) will emerge
out of a domestic political process of bargaining and con‡ict.
Assume, for simplicity, that the per unit cost of supplying either type
of public good is the same. Let 1 =  and 2 =  ¡ . Let  be the
weight attached to the non-elites’ welfare. Then, the social allocation
problem solves the maximization problem:
max
0··
 () =  ( ¡ ) + (1 ¡ ) ( ¡ ) (1)
where  () denotes the social welfare function. It is clear that the
solution to the allocation problem will depend critically on . Therefore,
in what follows, the key issue is to understand how the domestic political
process determines .
Democracy, renegotiation and bargaining
the model to allow for this possibility would not change the qualitative features of
our analysis while complicating the formal analysis reported here.
2We adopt the notation that for  = 12  (respectively, ) denotes the
partial derivative of  (respectively,  ) with respect to  and  (respectively, )
the associated cross-partial derivatives.
4Let there be 1 elites and 2 non-elites with 2  1.
To begin with, assume that  is determined by voting. With ma-
jority voting, as the median voter is a member of the non-elites, in this
case,  = 0. With proportional representation, the weight attached to
the preferences of each class will be equal to the fraction of population
belonging to that class and therefore,  = 1
1+2  1
2.
In most democracies, the actual policy choices made rarely mirror, in
a simple way, voting outcomes. Rather, policy choices are constrained by
the possibility of renegotiation (a coup, for example, or less overt forms
of manipulation such as lobbying or corruption) where the determining
factor is the bargaining power of di¤erent classes. In what follows, we
assume that the weights attached to elites’ and non-elites’ payo¤s in the
social welfare function do not re‡ect the (relative) numbers of individuals
in the group but their relative bargaining power.
A simple way of capturing such a process of renegotiation is via
Nash bargaining. We model the raw force of class  by its disagreement
point  which measures the fraction of available surplus class  is able
to appropriate in the event of a civil war against class  Moreover, we
assume that the two disagreement points are linked by a continuous
decreasing function  : [01] ! [01] with 2 = (1) such that whenever
0  1  1, 1 + 2 = 1 + (1)  1 but lim1!1 2 = (1) = 0 so
that there is always some surplus destruction in civil war but the surplus
destruction is minimal when the elites completely overwhelm the non-
elites. We assume that elites are more powerful than non-elites and
therefore, 1 ¸ 2 = (1). As 1  2, the bargaining power of elites
exceeds their relative numerical strength.
Corresponding to a disagreement point is a disagreement utility for
each class. Under Assumption 2, class , left to itself, will invest any
surplus it is able to appropriate in public good  and therefore, we
de…ne the disagreement utility of the elite as (1) = (10) and the
disagreement utility of the non-elite as (2) =  (02).




(( ¡ ) ¡ (1))( ( ¡ ) ¡ (2)) (2)
Let ¤ denote the solution to the Nash bargaining problem. The follow-
ing result characterizes ¤:
Proposition 1 The solution to the Nash bargaining problem, ¤, is in-
creasing in 1 with lim1!1 ¤ =  and whenever 1 ¸ (1),  ¸ 
2 with
equality when 1 = 2 = (1).
Proof. At an interior solution, the …rst-order condition characterizing
the solution to the maximization problem (2) is:
1(¤ ¡ ¤) ¡ 2(¤ ¡ ¤)
((¤ ¡ ¤) ¡ (1))
=
2(¤ ¡ ¤) ¡ 1(¤ ¡ ¤)
( (¤ ¡ ¤) ¡ (2))
(3)
Note that when 1 increases, 2 = (1) decreases and for a given , the
LHS of (3) increases and RHS of (3) decreases and therefore, as both ()
and  () are concave in , by Assumption 2,  must increase to maintain
equality. Therefore, ¤ is increasing in 1 and as 1 ¸ 2 = (1), by
Assumption 2, ¤ ¸ 
2 and with equality when 1 = 2. Moreover, as
lim1!1 2 = (1) = 0, as 1 ! 1, ¤ ! .
The above result demonstrates that the amount allocated to the pub-
lic good favored by the elites is an increasing function of the bargaining
power of the elites. Moreover, as long as elites are more powerful than
non-elites, more than half of the available surplus is allocated to the
public good favored by the elites and in extreme cases, when the elites
have all the bargaining power, all the available social surplus is allocated
to the public good favored by the elites.
In the analysis that follows, we focus on two cases, one where the
bargaining power of the two classes is relatively balanced and the other
where the bargaining power of the elites is very high. Formally, the …rst
case corresponds to a scenario where 1 ¸ 2 but 1 · 2+, for a small
but positive  and in this case, ¤ is close to but no lower than 
2 i.e. the
6available surplus is roughly equally allocated between the two types of
public goods with a slightly higher share being spent on the public good
favored by the elites. The second case corresponds to a scenario where
1 ! 1 and 2 ! 0 and in this case, ¤ is close to  i.e. all the available
surplus is allocated to the public good favored by the elites.
Are there values of  for which the solution of (1) corresponds to
these two bargaining scenarios? Let the solution3 to the social allocation
problem be denoted by ¤. The following proposition shows that this is
indeed the case:
Proposition 2 As long as  2 [1
2 1
2 + ), for some small but strictly
positive , ¤ remains close to but no lower than 
2. Moreover, for some
small but strictly positive , (a) if  2 [1¡,1] ¤ =  while if   1¡,
¤   and (b) as  ! 1 ¡ , ¤ ! .













































































 is continuous in , there exists an   0 such that as long
as  2 [1
2 1





=(1 ( ¡ ) ¡ 2 ( ¡ ))
+(1 ¡ )[1 ( ¡ ) ¡ 2 ( ¡ )]
is continuous in  and as
1 ( ¡ ) ¡ 2 ( ¡ ) = ¡[2 ( ¡ ) ¡ 1 ( ¡ )]
3Since the objective function in the allocation problem (1) is continuous and
strictly concave and the constraint set is compact and convex, there is a unique
solution to the social allocation problem (1).
7as long as   1
2,
()
  0. As
(1)
  0 for all  ¸ 0,  · , there
exists ^   1, so that when  ¸ ^ ,   1,
()
 ¸ 0 and ¤ =  and
when   ^ ,
()
  0 and ¤  .
The above result demonstrates that values of  close to but no lower
than 1
2 correspond to a balanced bargaining scenario where ¤ is close
to but no lower than 
2. In contrast, values of  close to 1 represent
bargaining scenarios where elites have all the bargaining power and ¤
is equal to .
Taken together, Proposition 1 and 2 demonstrate how renegotiation
and bargaining determine the relative weight attached to elites’ and non-
elites’ preferences in the social welfare function.
Transparency and sovereign debt write-downs
By using the results we obtained above, we are now in a position to
study the relationship between domestic governance and the condition-
ality requirements attached to a sovereign debt write-down. As already
pointed out, a sovereign debt write-down corresponds to the case when
there is an increase in the available …scal resources denoted by ¢. We
then analyze the impact of a debt write-down by …nding how ¤ (thus
¤
2 =  ¡ ¤),  (¤ ¡ ¤) and  (¤ ¡ ¤) change as  increases
to  + ¢.
In what follows, we show that the precise nature of the conditionality
depends on the degree of transparency in governance.
Transparency
By “transparency” we refer to a situation where structural or gov-
ernance reforms lower  veri…ably. As mentioned earlier, transparency
is the result of democratic and governance reforms that has two prop-
erties. First, there is veri…able information about . Second, non-elites
are able to hold domestic elites accountable so that the non-elites have
some bargaining power in the decisions on the allocation of social surplus
over di¤erent types of public goods i.e.  increases in value from zero.
Therefore, transparency not only requires obtaining veri…able informa-
tion about  but also requires an impact on the process by which the
value of  is determined.
The key parameter in the bargaining process between elites and non-
8elites is the relative position of the disagreement points of the elite and
non-elite i.e. 1 and 2 = (1). As Proposition 2 has shown,  is lowered
by increasing 2 and decreasing 1. Therefore, when there is veri…able
information about 1 and 2 = (1), structural and governance reforms
can directly target 1 and 2 = (1) and hence, .
Elite participation constraints will put a bound to how far 1 can
be pushed relative to 2 as it is perfectly possible that if structural or
governance reforms are too stringent, domestic elites will be able to resort
to other creditor countries to search for an alternative source of funds.
We assume that the lower bound on elites’ bargaining power corresponds
to a balanced bargaining scenario where 1 ¸ 2 but 1 · 2 + , for a
small but positive .
When  = 1
2, ¤ + ¢¤ = +¢
2 and as long as  2 [1
2 1
2 + ) for
some small but strictly positive , ¤ + ¢¤ remains close to but not
lower than +¢
2 : in this case, the non-elites and the elites bene…t equally
from a sovereign debt write-down. Evidently, structural and governance
reforms that lower  credibly and veri…ably are su¢cient to ensure that
an unconditional sovereign debt write-down improves non-elites’ welfare.
The requirement that structural and governance reforms lower  ver-
i…ably before a sovereign debt write-down occurs ensures that no fur-
ther conditionality requirements need to be attached to a sovereign debt
write-down.
Lack of Transparency
Lack of transparency refers to a situation where there is little or no
veri…able information about the renegotiation and bargaining process
between elites and non-elites. In this case, the conditionality require-
ments attached to a sovereign debt write-down cannot directly target .
When  2 [1 ¡ ,1] ¤ + ¢¤ =  + ¢: in this case, the non-elites do
not bene…t from a sovereign debt write-down. Clearly, an unconditional
debt write-down has no impact on non-elites’ welfare when the elites
continue to have all the bargaining power.
With a lack of transparency, to ensure that a sovereign debt write-
down improves non-elites’ utility, speci…c conditions that directly link
the extent of the debt write-down to additional expenditure on 2 is
9required. The general form for such a conditional debt write-down is
that ¢2 = ¢, for some 1
2 ·  · 1: the closer  is to 1, the higher
is the proportion of the additional …scal resources, freed up by the debt
write-down, actually spent on 2. As already argued, the lower bound
on  can re‡ect some underlying elite participation constraint.
We summarize the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 3 With transparency, no further conditionality is required
to ensure that a sovereign debt write-down improves non-elites’ welfare.
Without transparency, conditions that directly link the extent of the debt
write-down to additional expenditure on 2 is required to improve non-
elites’ welfare.
In the discussion so far, we have assumed that every extra unit of
…scal resources spent on 2 increases the amount of 2 available for con-
sumption by one unit as well. However, typically, the public expenditure
that has a higher marginal impact on non-elites’ welfare has several com-
ponents and how an extra unit of …scal resources is being splitted be-
tween di¤erent components has a critical impact. For example, increas-
ing spending on secondary education without increasing at the same time
spending on infrastructure projects that guarantee availability of regu-
lar water supply may mean that the extra places in secondary education
are not taken up. In this sense, when there is a lack of transparency,
the conditionality requirements attached to sovereign debt-write down
should not stop at restricting additional expenditure on the public good
favored by the elites but must also specify how the extra …scal resources
are splitted between di¤erent components of public expenditure that has
a higher marginal impact on non-elites’ welfare.
Conditionality in a dynamic model
Next, we extend the static model studied so far to a two-period set-
ting where new sovereign debt can be issued at the initial period. We
maintain the assumption that there is a lack of transparency. We as-
sume that elites have all the bargaining power and we ask whether the
conditionality requirements attached to an initial sovereign debt write-
down need to take into account the amount of new sovereign debt issued
10within the same time period.
The available …scal surplus in each period is denoted by ,  = 12
and 1 and 2 denote the amount spent on the two types of public
goods in each period. A sovereign debt write-down at  = 1 increases
the available …scal resources by ¢ in each period . In addition, at
 = 1,  ¸ 0 units of new sovereign debt (measured in units of social
surplus) can be issued in the form a one-period bond with interest rate
. Issuing  units of new sovereign debt has three e¤ects: (i) it increases
the available social surplus at  = 1 by , (ii) it increases the available
social surplus at  = 2 according to the production function 2 = ~ 2(),
(with ~ 2(0) = 1, ~ 0
2()  0, ~ 00
2()  0, lim!0 ~ 0
2() = 14) (iii)
it decreases the available social surplus at  = 2 by (1 + ), which
is the debt repayment that becomes due at  = 2. Finally, note that
productive e¢ciency requires that the amount of new debt issued at
 = 1 satis…es the equation ~ 0
2( ^ ) = (1+) i.e. the marginal productivity
of an additional unit of new debt (measured in units of social surplus)
is equal to its marginal cost.
In this setting, we assume that a fraction , 0    1, of the …scal
resources controlled by elites (and nothing else, including any planned
expenditure on 2) can be protected from the consequences of default.
This corresponds to the idea of a capital ‡ight engineered by the elites
in the event of default.
Suppose that in each period, the conditionality attached to a debt
write-down is ¢2 = ¢ 1
2 ·  · 1. For later reference, we refer to
such conditionality requirements as static conditionality requirements.
Then, at  = 1, 11 = 1 +  + (1 ¡ )¢ and 21 = ¢. At
 = 2, 12 = 2 ¡ (1 + ) + (1 ¡ )¢ if there is no default and
12 = (2 + (1 ¡ )¢) if there is default while 22 = ¢ if there
is no default and 22 = 0 if there is default.
At  = 2, for a …xed , we …rst determine the default decision.
4In e¤ect, we are assuming that ~ 2() is an increasing, concave function of 
whose marginal productivity is very high for values of  close to zero.
11Default will be the preferred option for the elites if









Note that (1 + (1 ¡ )¢¢)   ([1 + (1 ¡ )¢]0). There-
fore, as 1  0 and ~ 0
2()  0, default occurs with a positive probability
if and only if  ¸ max  0 where max  0 is the unique solution to
the equation









At max, elites are indi¤erent between defaulting and not defaulting.
Moreover, max is an upper bound on the amount of new sovereign debt
issued by the elites at  = 1 as, whenever   max, default occurs with
probability one. Note that the LHS of the preceding equation reaches









2( ^ )  0.
Therefore, max  ^ .




 (1 +  + (1 ¡ )¢¢)+

³
~ 2() ¡ (1 + ) + (1 ¡ )¢¢
´ (4)
where  is the discount factor. Let ¤ denote the solution to (4). The




1 (1 +  + (1 ¡ )¢¢)+
1
³
~ 2() ¡ (1 + ) + (1 ¡ )¢¢
´h
~ 0




As long as (0)  0, ¤  0. As max  ^  and 1  0, ( ^ )  0,
¤  ^ . If (max)  0, ¤ = max. When ¤ = max, even an 
probability of default, for a small but positive , will not leave the elites
worse-o¤ but will have a discrete impact on the non-elites’ welfare. With

















 (1 +  + (1 ¡ )¢¢) + 
³







In addition, as long as the two public goods are complements in elites’
preferences so that 12  0 andfor any constant , 1 ( + (1 ¡ )¢¢)
is an increasing function of  and therefore, () is an increasing
function of . Further, if ¤









We summarize the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In a dynamic setting without transparency, in addition
to the static conditionality requirements, the initial debt write-down has
to be directly linked to the amount of new debt issued.
3 Policy Implications
At present, multilateral organizations (like the World Bank and the G8
countries) have used the enhanced HIPC initiative and the MDRI (also
known as the Gleneagles Proposal for debt write-down) as the main
mechanisms by which indebtedness of the low-income countries, espe-
cially the HIPCs, is reduced. However, the progress and outcome of
debt relief under these initiatives are still unsatisfactory. Using the for-
mal analysis developed in the preceding section, here we discuss why this
is the case. We begin by evaluating the e¢cacy of the enhanced HIPC
initiative, followed by the MDRI.
The enhanced HIPC initiative was agreed by the G7 countries at
their July 1999 Summit in Cologne, Germany. This initiative has been
notable because of its emphasis on ensuring that the debt stock of HIPCs
13is reduced to a sustainable level. However, the concept of sustainability
used under this framework is based on the use of arbitrary formulas5
instead of basing on a systematic assessment of each country’s needs
for debt relief, measured against explicit development objectives like
the MDGs (Sachs6, 2002). Moreover, the debt write-down under the
enhanced HIPC initiative has been linked to inappropriate conditionality
requirements, particularly those related to the IMF program. The main
criticism of IMF conditionality that emerges from our model is that
it does not address the di¢culties faced by HIPCs to focus on their
priorities, such as addressing the problems of inadequate investment in
education and health, the public goods favored by the poor. The myriad
of conditions set forth by the IMF, emphasizing on …scal discipline and
capital account liberalization, could lead us to a situation where “the
country is just as impoverished but with more debts and even richer
ruling elite,” (Stiglitz, 2003).
Our analysis suggests that democratic and governance reforms that
ensure transparency are key to ensure that non-elites’ welfare is improved
by a debt write down. Some elements of the HIPC initiative, such as
the requirement that the qualifying country needs to establish a track
record of sound policies through IMF and World Bank’s International
Development Association (IDA) supported programs as well as develop
a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a broad-based par-
ticipatory process (IMF, 2007a; World Bank, 2007), are consistent with
the analysis reported here.
To help accelerate progress toward the MDGs and respond to the
request made by the Commission for Africa7, the enhanced HIPC Ini-
5The benchmark for debt sustainability under this enhanced HIPC initiative was
set at 150 percent of debt-to-export ratio (on a net present value basis) or 250 percent
NPV of debt to tax revenue for countries with open economies (which require a min-
imum of 30 percent export-to-GNP ratio) and a substantial tax revenue (a minimum
of 15 percent of GNP) (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002).
6Sachs (2002) proposed that each country should come up with its own speci…c
“business plan” for scaling up health, education and basic infrastructure as a part of
an overall strategy for meeting the MDGs. Then, basing on such plan, the external
funding agency should consider whether or not the country’s debts are sustainable
and what are the size of …nancial gaps that must be bridged by debt write-downs.
7After realizing that it is di¢cult for the MDGs to be achieved if debt obligations
14tiative was supplemented by the MDRI, which allows for a complete
write-down on eligible debts by the IMF, the IDA and the African De-
velopment Fund (AfDF) for countries, which reached the completion
point under the HIPC Initiative process (IMF, 2007b). For such ini-
tiatives to provide greater relief to poor indebted nations and achieve
the MDGs, either domestic and governance reforms that ensure trans-
parency have to be put in place or the debt write-down has to directly
target non-elites’ welfare.
A mechanism akin to the “Poverty Action Fund” used in Uganda
can be a useful starting point. The money that would have been spent
on servicing debts can then be directed to the Poverty Action Fund
and from there the money will be channelled into the country’s health
and education systems. This type of mechanism can help minimize the
chance that government diverts the public funds to support corruption
and transfers them to safe havens overseas8.
The kind of conditionality requirements that we advocate here can
also be attached to foreign aid9. However, debt write-down has several
advantages over foreign aid. First, a single debt write-down creates a
‡ow of …scal revenues over a period of time. Second, a debt write-down
tends to be multilateral and not bilateral: therefore, the conditional-
ity requirements tend to be more e¤ective in improving the non-elites’
welfare.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we ask if sovereign debt write-downs could be used to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We have shown
that transparency is the key feature of domestic governance that deter-
of many low-income countries are still excessive, the Commission for Africa called for
a 100 percent debt write-down and a boost in aid (Commission for Africa, 2005).
8By no mean restricted to low-income countries, this model may be applied to
study similar problems in Latin America, where the elites divert public funds to safe
havens overseas.
9We set aside a major limitation of foreign aid in that it is often tied as the donor
country mandates that the money from aid be spent in the country providing aid (the
donor country) or in a group of selected countries or on goods or services produced
in the selected countries. Clearly, a debt write-down will not have this feature.
15mines howa sovereign debt write-down is structured to attain the MDGs.
When domestic governance is transparent, an unconditional debt write-
down can enhance the non-elites’ welfare. Without such transparency,
conditions that directly link the debt write-down to public goods that
improve non-elites’ welfare is required. In the latter case, in a dynamic
setting, the debt write-down also has to be directly linked to the amount
of new sovereign debt issued. Using our formal analysis, we evaluate the
e¢cacy of the current debt relief initiatives and discuss some policy im-
plications.
Extending the model to study the link between sovereign debt write-
downs and growth on one hand, and the conditions under which a sov-
ereign debt write-down stimulates the in‡ow of private capital are im-
portant topics for future research.
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